

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM: [] CSE-2

SUBJECT: Discussion with Win Scott, Chief I & R, re problems involved
in recruiting Bulgarians resident in Canada.

1. I arranged to see Mr. Scott at 1030 hours on 12 February 1954. I told him of our interest in recruiting a Bulgarian emigre leader, Ivan DOCHEV, who was presently residing in Toronto, Canada. I said that our initial interest was in being able to talk with him for the purpose of assessing his potential for this Branch. I pointed out that we were most hesitant to send anyone to Canada to talk with him so that we would not tip our hand to the Canadians in advance, and that if possible, we should like to keep any possible operational use of DOCHEV from the Canadian Service.
2. Mr. Scott stated that he knew from recent discussions with the Chief of the Canadian Service that British Intelligence was pretty well cut-in on any Canadian agents and/or operations, so that if we were to approach the Canadians on the matter of DOCHEV or others, we would have to assume that BIS would know about it.
3. I replied that it might eventually become necessary to clear this with the Canadians, but that until we felt we had to do so, we would naturally prefer to keep them out of it. Mr. Scott agreed with this, but asked how I proposed to get in touch with the man.
4. I told him that we had a covert associate, whose connection with any U.S. government activity was unknown, who had at our instance taken a trip to Toronto last year to attend the annual convention of the American-Bulgarian League, and had met and talked with DOCHEV. It appeared that DOCHEV was

(This is [])

[]

4. (Cont'd) favorably impressed with our covert associate and that he had been in correspondence with him since. Recently DOCHEV had written to our associate asking him if he had any ideas as to how he (DOCHEV) could get in touch with any one in the U.S. Government or with NCPE in order to get into some anti-communist work, stating that he had some 200 men who had sworn to serve him. ~~Therefore, it was decided that the next day~~ At my instruction, our associate had replied to DOCHEV that he had a friend who was in the government, and would at the next opportunity, take up the matter with him and see what could be done, but pointing out that since he himself (our associate) was not connected with the government, he would of necessity have to turn over any such dealings to his friend in Washington.

5. Therefore, I suggested that the most secure method of handling the initial arrangements would be for our associate to take a "pleasure" trip to Canada and stop off in Toronto long enough to see DOCHEV and give him directions and instructions about getting a visa and coming to the U.S., thus avoiding any letters giving instructions as to meeting, etc.

6. Mr. Scott agreed that this seemed perfectly all right as there could be no objection on the part of the Canadians if we talked with anyone who was in the U.S. He added that the chief of the JIB had told him that personally when the question had come up in a recent discussion while the JIB chief had been in Washington.

7. We also discussed the matter of how we might be able to get information on Bulgarian refugees in Canada, and Mr. Scott replied that we could submit a request for debriefing thru him to the Canadians, or that we could send

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7. (Cont'd) questionnaires. It was suggested that if we had any particular individuals in which we were interested, we could include their names in a list of names of persons in whom we were not interested. I said I would look into the matter as we had several ex-agents who had been terminated in Athens and who had emigrated to Canada. (Two of these are [] and [])

NOTE:

A few days after [] took his trip to Canada to see DOCHIEV, I advised Mr. ~~Myattvikiat~~ Scott that this had been done, and he said that as far as he could see there was no problem with regard to Canadian liaison.